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THE SUPREME COURT-OCTOBER 1959 TERM

Bernard Schwartz*

A

constitutional law is but a reflection of its political,
economic, and social life. Not unnaturally, the external
conditions of any particular period are bound to have their effects
in the legal sphere as well-especially in the field of public law.
This is as true of the United States as it is of other countries. From
this point of view, the constitutional jurisprudence of the American
Supreme Court is only the juristic mirror of the different stages
through which American history has passed. 'Our jurisprudence is
distinctive,' said Justice Jackson on the 150th anniversary of the
Supreme Court, 'in that every great movement in American history
has produced a leading case in this court.' "1
With these words, the present 1-vriter began an article explaining recent developments in our constitutional law to a British
audience. To one familiar with the work of the nation's highest
Court, the statement quoted is almost a truism. Any commentary
on a Supreme Court term is also a commentary on the life of the
nation in the period covered.
During our generation, this country has gone through successive stages of both internal and external stress. Disastrous economic
depression, world conflict, a period of cold war-these have furnished the constant crises with which government in our day has
had to cope. Inevitably, these crises have all had their impact
upon the constitutional law dispensed by the Supreme Court.
The constitutional decisions of the 1959 Term, like those of
preceding terms, mirrored the events of the period during which
the term took place. A nationwide strike in a basic industry brought
forth a decision on the congressional provision intended to deal with
such stoppages.2 Strains in our federalism gave rise to holdings on
the interplay of state and federal power.3 Our position as an overseas power was reflected in decisions on military jurisdiction beyond
our borders.4 The struggle to vindicate civil rights had continuing
judicial impact in a series of important cases.5
COUNTRY's
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During the past term, the high bench remained a storm center
in our governmental structure. An observer of the Court cannot,
however, but note with satisfaction that the controversy about the
Court has greatly diminished in intensity. In part, as in the 1958
Term, this has been due to the Court itself, which has been remolding its jurisprudence to meet much of the criticism directed against
it. But, even more so, this quieting of controversy has reflected the
acceptance among the vast majority of our people of the need for
the performance by the Court of its constitutional role. With
Justice Story over a century ago, most Americans would still say,
"The universal sense of America has decided, that in the last resort
the judiciary must decide upon the constitutionality of the acts
and laws of the general and state governments, so far as they are
capable of being made the subject of judicial controversy." 6 The
most significant thing about the Supreme Court is, after all, the
continued performance by it of its constitutional function and the
continued acceptance by the mass of Americans of such performance. This remains the basic aspect of our system-as significant
in an analysis of recent developments as it would be in an over-all
historical account.

I.

"A.LL STATES

.ARE EQUAL"

Delivering the judgment in the now-classic equity case of Penn
v. Lord Baltimore,7 Lord Hardwicke, L.C., declared that the case
was "of a nature worthy the judicature of a Roman senate rather
than of a ... judge: and my consolation is, that if I should err in
my judgment, there is a judicature equal in dignity to a Roman
senate, that will correct it."8 What Lord Hardwicke said about
the nature of Penn v. Lord Baltimore might be said with equal
propriety about United States v. Louisiana9 -though, in this country of course the members of the supreme tribunal can hardly console themselves with the thought about a higher corrective jurisdiction articulated by his Lordship.
The Louisiana case was an original action brought by the
United States against the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas, for a declaration that the United States was
entitled to exclusive possession of, and full dominion and power
over, the lands, minerals, and other things underlying the waters
o 3 STORY, Co.-.n.lENTARIFS ON THE CoNsrrrurION
71 Vesey Sen. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750).
8 Id. at 446, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1134.
9 363 U.S. 1 (1960).

OF THE UNITED STATES §

1570 (1833).
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of the Gulf of Mexico more than three geographic miles seaward
from the coast of each defendant state and extending to the edge
of Continental Shelf. The case itself was the most recent phase of
the over twenty years' dispute between the coastal states and the
federal government over their respective rights to exploit the oil
and other natural resources of offshore submerged lands. In the
earlier case of United States v. California10 the high Court had
held that, as against California, the United States possessed paramount rights in such lands underlying the Pacific Ocean seaward
of the low-water mark on the coast of California and outside of
inland waters. Similar holdings were made in later cases against
several of the Gulf states.11
After these decisions Congress passed the Submerged Lands
Act.12 By it the United States relinquished to all coastal states the
lands and resources under navigable waters extending three geographical miles seaward from their coastlines. In addition, the
five Gulf states were granted the submerged lands as far out as each
state's boundary line either "existed at the time such State became
a member of the Union," or had been previously "approved by
Congress." But in no event was any state to have "more than three
marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico."
The Louisiana case essentially involved the application of this
statutory provision to the five Gulf states. Each of those states
claimed a three-league boundary and grant. The Supreme Court
denied such claim as to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, but
held in favor of Texas and Florida. When Texas was an independent republic, it had asserted a three-league maritime boundary. This claim, the Court held, was recognized by the Congress
both when Texas was admitted to the Union and when it was readmitted after the Civil War. Hence the Texas claim came within
the Submerged Lands Act. Florida's constitution when it was
readmitted to the Union following the Civil War contained a
provision which described her Gulf boundary as extending three
leagues. By readmitting Florida, Congress was held to have "approved" her three-league boundary within the meaning of the
Submerged Lands Act. The Court, in other words, concluded
that Texas and Florida had adequately proved the past existence
of three-league boundaries recognized by the Congress, while the
other three Gulf states had not.
10 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
11 United States v. Louisiana,

339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707
(1950).
12 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958).
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The difficulty of the problem presented to the Court by the
Submerged Lands Act should be recognized first of all. The
earlier decisions with regard to the offshore-oil lands met strong
opposition in the political branches of the Government. The
Eisenhower Administration requested Congress to state specifically,
in proposed legislation, what rights in addition to those allowed
by the Court the Gulf states were to possess. Congress was, however, too torn by conflicting political pressures to make the decision
itself. Instead, it left the decision to the Supreme Court. The
Solicitor General stated during argument, "It was a difficult political question, and Congress didn't want to have to choose one alternative or the other." To which remark, Justice Frankfurter interposed, "What's the Supreme Court for except to bail them out?"13
A statute passed to enable the high Court to "bail" the Congress out will rarely be easy for the Justices to apply. Hence, it
may be somewhat unfair for a critique to be directed against their
application of such law. If, indeed, the only doubts to be expressed were on comparatively minor matters of statutory interpretation,14 it might well be sounder to remain silent. But the
Louisiana application of the Submerged Lands Act is based upon
a view of the status of the states that does violence to the fundamental conception upon which the American Union is grounded.
In commenting to the press on the Louisiana case, a congressman from one of the losing states declared, "A state is in the Union
or it is not in the Union. They should all be treated alike-or
is that asking too much of the Supreme Court?"15 This comment
strikes at the basic weakness of the Louisiana decision. It is not an
answer to say that the test used by the Court is that chosen by the
Congress, which imposed on the Court the duty of treating the
states unequally. For overhanging both the Louisiana decision
and the Submerged Lands Act itself is the question whether such
inequality among the states is consistent with the theory upon
which our federation rests.
Although the Constitution may not expressly so provide, it has
always been basic that equality is the dominant theme of the Union.
·when once admitted, a new state stands upon an equal footing ·with
all existing states, in all respects.16 "Equality of constitutional
18 N.Y. Times, June 2, 1960, p. 25, col. 3.
14 E.g., whether the Court is correct in interpreting admission claims to include
"readmission" claims.
l5N.Y. Times, June 2, 1960, p. 25, col. 2.
16 This principle even antedates the Constitution, for it was first stated in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, LAWS OF THE TERRITORY NORTHWEST 66 (1833).
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right and power is the condition of all the States of the Union, old
and new."17 So strong has this principle been that the Court has
consistently held invalid preadmission requirements imposed by
the Congress upon new states, as conditions precedent to congressional consent to admission.18
The clear result of the Louisiana decision, on the other hand,
is inequality of treatment for the states concerned. Texas may
well have had the right to assert rights beyond the three-mile limit
when it was an independent nation. However, by entering the
Union Texas surrendered the right to claim more than her sister
states. "If it were necessary for Texas to surrender all her property
and political rights in the marginal sea in order to enter the Union
on an 'equal footing' with the other States, pray how can she get
back some of those rights and still remain on an 'equal footing'
with the other States?"19 Nor is it an answer to say, as the Court
does, that it is up to the Congress to dispose of federal property as
it sees fit. 2 ° Congressional' authority in this respect should not include the power to perpetuate or permit inequalities among the
states.
In Justice Douglas' words, "Our Union is one of equal sovereigns, none entitled to preferment denied the others. That is
what the 'equal footing' standard means or it means nothing.'' 21
Under the Louisiana decision, indeed, may we not convert the
"equal footing" standard into Orwellian terms: All states are
equal; but some states are more equal than others.
JI.

JUDICIAL POWER AND NATIONWIDE STRIKES

To the foreign observer, the most striking feature of the American constitutional system is the doctrine of judicial supremacy.
"No feature in the government of the United States," writes Lord
Bryce, "has awakened so much curiosity in the European mind,
caused so much discussion, received so much admiration, and been
more frequently misunderstood, than the duties assigned to the
Supreme Court and the functions which it discharges in guarding
the ark of the Constitution."22 Under the doctrine of judicial
supremacy, it has been the highest Court that has determined conflicts between acts of government and the Constitution, and it has
17 Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1883).
18 The leading case is Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (19ll).
10 Justice Douglas dissenting in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272,
20 363 U.S. 1, 7, citing Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
21 Supra note 19, at 283.
22

1

BRYCE, THE AMERICAN CO!',lMONWEALTH

242 (1913 ed.).

283 (1954).
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done so through the technical forms of the lawsuit. Struggles over
power that in Europe call forth regiments of troops, in this country
call forth battalions of lawyers.23
In the Louisiana case, the high bench resolved a dispute between conflicting sovereignties comparable to those ordinarily
within the competence of international tribunals rather than ordinary courts of law. In United Steelworkers v. United States,2 4 on
the other hand, the Court was called upon to intervene in a nationwide strike in the steel industry.
The Steelworkers case arose from an action by the Attorney
General for an injunction against the continuation of an industrywide strike of workers in the steel industry. The President, after
finding that the strike, if allowed to continue, would imperil the
national health and safety, created a Board of Inquiry, under the
relevant sections of the Taft-Hartley Act. 25 After the Board had
proved unable to resolve the dispute, the President, reiterating his
former pronouncement that the continuance of the strike constituted a threat to the national health and safety, ordered the
Attorney General to seek an injunction. The action was-brought
under a Taft-Hartley Act provision26 vesting the district court with
jurisdiction to enjoin a strike if it finds that the strike affects an
entire industry or a substantial part thereof and, if permitted to
occur or continue, will imperil the national health or safety. The
district court in the instant case made the necessary findings and
issued the injunction.
The most significant question presented in the Steelworkers
case arises directly out of the doctrine of judicial supremacy. A
Court accoutered with the constitutional authority vested in our
highest tribunal, which, at the same time, is endowed with neither
the sword nor the purse wielded by the political branches, must
move warily in exercising power. Above all must it be vigilant
to ensure that it remains within the limits traditionally associated
with judicial power, lest it otherwise appear to usurp the power
to intervene directly in political controversies. It should not be
forgotten that the Framers deliberately withheld from the high
Court power that was purely political in form, such as a forthright
power to veto or revise legislation. Instead, they delegated to the
Court "the judicial power" alone-a power which, by the express
23 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
24 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
25 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1958).
26 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1958).

XI (1941).
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language of Article III, extends only to the resolution of "Cases"
and "Controversies."
The result of the constitutional restriction is that the Supreme
Court's only power is to decide lawsuits between opposing litigants
with real interests at stake, and its only method of proceeding is by
the conventional judicial process. As Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan stated, concurring in the Steelworkers case, "Judicial power
could come into play only in matters such as were the traditional
concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways
that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies.' " 27
Petitioner union in Steelworkers had contended that the grant
to the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin strikes such as the steel
stoppage was not a grant of "judicial power" within the meaning
of Article III and was therefore beyond the power of the Congress
to confer. This contention was rejected by the Court.
Although the Court's reasoning was articulated only in a brief
per curiam opinion, its conclusion on the point under discussion
appears sound. Petitioner's contention was, in effect, based upon
the claim that the Taft-Hartley Act made the courts more or less
administrative adjuncts of the President for the purpose of acting
against nationwide strikes. If that were the situation, with the
judiciary acting, in Justice Douglas' phrase, only as a "rubber
stamp for the President" or "as the President's Administrative
Assistant," 28 Article III would clearly be violated. "If the federal
court is to be merely an automaton stamping the papers an Attorney General presents, the judicial function rises to no higher
level than an IBM machine.'' 29 However, the district court in the
instant case was not functioning as an automaton. Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, the court, not the President, fashions the decree.
Furthermore, the statute imposes upon the court the duty of finding, on its own judgment, whether the strike meets the statutory
conditions of breadth of involvement and peril to the national
health or safety. The availability of judicial relief under TaftHartley thus depends upon judicially-made findings of fact. Of
the matters decided by the courts, there is no review by other governmental agencies.
Far from being foreign to the ordinary type of "judicial power,"
the authority vested in the courts to issue a Taft-Hartley "eighty21 361 U.S. 39, 60 (1959).
28Jd. at 71.
20 Ibid.
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day injunction" appears but to be a modern equivalent of the
traditional power of the courts to abate public nuisances. The
power to enjoin public nuisances at the suit of the Government has
been a commonplace of judicial jurisdiction in the Anglo-American
world. The criteria for judicial action under Taft-Hartley-peril
to health or safety-are similar to those on which courts have customarily acted in public nuisance cases. "There can therefore be
no doubt that, being thus akin to jurisdiction long historically
exercised, the function to be performed by the District Courts
under § 208 (a) is within the 'judicial Power' as contemplated by
Art. III, § 2, and is one which Congress may thus confer upon the
courts."30
One can indeed, go further and wonder whether, absent the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,31 the federal courts could not grant an
injunction against a nationwide strike in an essential industry
under their traditional equity powers, even without the TaftHartley Act. In the well-known Debs case,32 an injunction was
issued against the 1894 Pullman strike partially upon the ground
that the Government might invoke judicial power to abate what
was in effect a nuisance detrimental to the public interest; the strike
in question resulted in interference with the mail and interruption
of interstate commerce. Under the Debs approach, there appears
to be adequate legal warrant for action by the Government against
a nationwide strike like that in the Steelworkers case, even without express statutory authorization. A fortiori, if Congress expressly authorizes an injunction in such cases, there should be
no legal question of judicial power when such decree is actually
issued.
III.

MILITARY LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION

A problem that has grown in importance in an era dominated
by war and cold war is that of the relationship between military
law and the Constitution. Since the last war this problem has
taken on a new dimension due to the presence of American forces
in different countries for purposes of military occupation and to
fulfill our defensive commitments to our overseas allies. Of
course, those actually serving in the armed forces, whether at home
30 Id. at 61-62 (concurring opinion of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan).
31 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 101-115
(1958), does not affect this, since, under United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258 (1947), that statute is not applicable in an action brought by the Government.
32 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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or abroad, are clearly subject to military law and the provisions of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.33 A difficulty arises, however, with regard to those who may accompany members of the
armed forces abroad. May such persons, consistently with the
Constitution, be subjected to the jurisdiction of military tribunals?
The Uniform Code of Military Justice itself contains a provision34 under which all persons accompanying the armed forces outside the continental limits of the United States are made subject to
the Code; this means, as a practical matter, that they are subject to
court-martial jurisdiction. In the 1957 Term, in Reid v. Covert,35
the Supreme Court held this provision unconstitutional when applied to civilian dependents charged with capital offenses. But
Covert left open more questions than it answered. Under it, a
civilian dependent of an American serviceman abroad may not
constitutionally be tried for a capital offense by other than an
Article III court. Is the same true where such dependent is
charged with an offense less than capital? And what of civilian
employees of the armed forces abroad?
These questions were answered in three cases decided during
the past term. The first of them, Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton,36 dealt with the question specifically raised, though not
answered, in Reid v. Covert-whether a civilian dependent abroad
could be tried by court-martial for a noncapital offense. The
Covert Court split evenly on this point.37 In the Singleton case,
on the other hand, a clear majority of the Court ruled that the
Covert holding did extend to noncapital offenses.38 Hence, a
civilian dependent could not be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction in any case in time of peace, whether such case be capital or
noncapital in character.
The opinion of the Court in Singleton was delivered by Justice
Clark, who had dissented in Covert. This is not as inconsistent as
it may at first glance appear, for, in his Covert dissent, Justice
Clark had been emphatic in declaring that there was nowhere in
the Constitution any basis for distinguishing between capital and
noncapital offenses, so far as court-martial jurisdiction over
70A Stat. !16 (1956), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1958).
64 Stat. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 552 (11) [now 10 U.S.C. § 802 (11)].
85 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
86 361 U .s. 234 (1960).
37 Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, and Chief Justice Warren stated that a courtmartial may not be used for a noncapital offense; Justices Clark, Burton, Frankfurter, and
Harlan took the opposite approach. Justice Whittaker did not participate in the decision.
88 Only Justices Harlan and Frankfurter dissented from this ruling.
33

lH
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civilians was concemed.39 Thus, unless the Covert decision were
to be overruled, its holding had to apply to all conduct proscribed
by the Uniform Code, whether capital or noncapital in nature.
The principal question, as Justice Whittaker pointed out in a
concurring opinion, is one of the status of the person accused. In
his words, "courts-martial either do or do not have jurisdiction
and, hence, power to try the accused for all offenses against the
military law or for none at all." 40 Since, under Covert, Congress
may not constitutionally provide for court-martial trial of civilian
dependents in capital cases, neither can it do so in noncapital
c:ases.41
In Grisham v. Hagan42 and McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo,4 3 decided the same day as Singleton, the majority of
the Court held that court-martial jurisdiction could not constitutionally extend to civilians employed overseas by the military
services. Grisham involved a capital offense; Guagliardo, a noncapital one.
Grisham is based directly upon the Covert reasoning. Under
Covert, said Justice Clark, the death penalty is so drastic "that a
dependent charged with a capital crime must have the benefit of
a jury. The awesomeness of the death penalty has no less impact
when applied to civilian employees.''44 But, if that is true, then
the Singleton rationale requires the same result in civilian employee noncapital cases. Hence Guagliardo holds that, like the
civilian dependent, the civilian employee overseas is wholly exempt
from military jurisdiction.
Justice Whittaker, in his dissent to these two cases, urged that
the Covert case was limited to "civilian dependents." In his view,
there was a marked and clear difference between such dependents
and American civilians employed by the armed forces at military
posts in foreign lands. The latter perform essential services for
the military and, -therefore, should be subject to the same rules of
military justice as the "members" of the armed forces.
It must be admitted that the Court's decisions in Singleton,
Grisham, and Guagliardo pose serious practical problems. It is
now most difficult for Congress to frame a workable scheme for
subjecting civilians living and working on American bases abroad
39 354
40 361
41 Id.
42 361

U.S. 1, 89 (1957).
U.S. 234, 263 (1960).
at 248.
U.S. 278 (1960).
43 36J U.S. 281 (1960).
44 Supra note 42, at 280.

1961]

THE SUPREME COURT -

1959

TERM

413

to necessary and proper rules governing their conduct. The various
alternatives which may be possible45 appear to be all but unworkable. Perhaps the only reasonable alternative is to subject our
civilian dependents and employees to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the countries in which the bases on which they live and work are
located-a solution which is both workable and in accord with
international law, even though it will hardly seem satisfactory to
many Americans.
At the same time, to the constitutional observer, Singleton,
Grisham, and Guagliardo will take their place in the line of cases
starting ·with Ex parte Milligan,46 which stand as constant reaffirmations of the basic separation of the military from the civil. Indeed,
in Covert the Court asserted, "A statute cannot be framed by which
a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace."41 Certainly, that is the import of the cases
which have been discussed. Under our Constitution, courts of
law alone are given power to try civilians.48
IV.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND EQUAL PROTECTION

In few areas has the work of the highest tribunal in recent years
been more consequential than in that of applying the equal protection clause. And in few respects has the Supreme Court of the
past twenty years differed more from its predecessors than in its
readiness to give full effect to the constitutional guaranty of equal
protection of the laws for the Negro.
Before 1957, the function of ensuring that equal protection
would become more than a mere political slogan was almost entirely assumed by the judicial branch of the Government. In that
year Congress, for the first time in almost a century, assumed a positive role in this field by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1957.49
Like all other legislation, however, the civil rights statute is not a
self-executing document. The ought laid down in 1957 must run
the gantlet of judicial interpretation before it attains the practical
status of an is. Are not Chief Justice Hughes' celebrated words,
"We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
411 Some of them are discussed by Justice Clark dissenting in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
87-89 (1957).
46 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
47 354 U.S. 1, !15 (1957), quoting WINTHROP, Mn.rr.ARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 107 (2d ed.
1920) (Winthrop's italics).
48 Compare id. at 40.
40 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1958).
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judges say it is," true as well with regard to legislation? Any statute,
in actual practice, is what the judges say it is.
During the past term, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 began its
inevitable course through the gantlet of Supreme Court construction. Nor can it be gainsaid that the decisions rendered thus far
have been of basic importance to implementation of the statute.
The law itself, it can hardly be denied, was a watered-do,vn compromise. If its terms were to be read by the high bench in a
decimating spirit, it would surely lose all practical efficacy.
In this past term, however, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that it will construe that statute with a benevolent eye in
order to give it the full remedial effect that Congress intended.
In United States v. Raines/' 0 the United States brought an action
against the members of the Board of Registrars and certain Deputy
Registrars of Terrell County, Georgia. The complaint, seeking an
injunction and other relief, charged that the defendants had,
through various devices in the administration of their offices, discriminated on racial grounds against Negroes who desired to register to vote in elections conducted in the state. The district court
dismissed the complaint, holding the relevant subsection of the
1957 statute unconstitutional. According to the district court the
statutory language allowed the United States to enjoin purely private action designed to deprive citizens of the right to vote on
account of their race or color. Although the complaint in question
involved only official action, the court ruled that since, in its opinion, the statute on its face was susceptible of application beyond the
scope permissible under the fifteenth amendment, it was to be
considered unconstitutional in all its applications.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the instant
case plainly involved a proceeding against official action within the
meaning of the fifteenth amendment, the lower court had erred in
ruling the statute invalid because of its possible scope in hypothetical cases not presented. As Justice Brennan stated, "[W]hatever precisely may be the reach of the fifteenth amendment, it is
enough to say that the conduct charged ... is certainly, as 'state
action' and the clearest form of it, subject to the ban of that amendment, and that legislation designed to deal with such discrimination is 'appropriate legislation' under it."51 Because the complaint
here called for a clearly constitutional application of the statute,
that should have ended the question of constitutionality in this case.
50

362 U.S. 17 (1960).
25.

51Jd. at
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Appellees in the Raines case went farther and urged that it
was beyond the power of Congress to authorize the Government to
bring an action in support of private constitutional rights. This
contention, which went to the heart of congressional power to implement the post-bellum amendments, was also rejected by the
Court. Said Justice Brennan, "[T]here is the highest public interest in the due observance of all the constitutional guarantees, including those that bear the most directly on private rights, and we
think it perfectly competent for Congress to authorize the United
States to be the guardian of that public interest in a suit for injunctive relief." 02 Certainly, if, as already seen in our discussion
of the Steelworkers case,53 Congress can empower the Government
to seek injunctions against nationwide strikes, it should be able
to authorize the Government to seek decrees against violations of
constitutional voting rights-particularly where the relevant constitutional provision expressly empowers Congress to enforce it by
appropriate legislation.54
While the Raines case dealt with a challenge to the validity of
the Civil Rights Act itself, Hannah v. Larche,5 5 on the other hand,
involved a challenge to the functioning of the Civil Rights Commission, an agency of the executive branch of the Government
set up under the 1957 statute. It concerned the validity of certain
rules of procedure adopted by the Commission. The case arose
out of the Commission's investigation of alleged Negro voting
deprivations in Louisiana. The appellees, registrars of voters in
Louisiana, having been summoned to appear before a hearing
which the Commission proposed to conduct in Shreveport, Louisiana, petitioned the federal district court to enjoin the Commission
from holding its anticipated hearing. It was alleged, among other
things, that the Commission's rules of procedure governing the
conduct of its investigations were unconstitutional. The specific
rules challenged provided that the identity of persons submitting
complaints to the Commission need not be disclosed, and that those
summoned to testify before the Commission, including persons
against whom complaints had been filed, might not cross-examine
other witnesses called by the Commission.
The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged procedural rules
were consistent with due process. This was true, said the Court,
ll2Id. at 27.
Note 24 supra.
See also United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960).
511363 U.S. 420 (1960).
ll3
M
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because of the nature of the functions vested in the Civil Rights
Commission. As described by Chief Justice Warren, "[I]ts function is purely investigative and fact-finding. It does not adjudicate.
It does not hold trials or determine anyone's civil or criminal liability. It does not issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or
impose any legal sanctions. It does not make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or property. In short, the Commission does not and cannot take any affirmative action which ·will
affect an individual's legal rights. The only purpose of its existence
is to find facts which may subsequently be used as the basis for
legislative or executive action." 56
Whether due process demands a full adversary hearing depends
entirely upon the nature of the governmental function involved.
"[W]hen governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals,
it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have
traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the
other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an
adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply
of judicial procedures be used." 57 Since the rights claimed by
appellees are those normally associated only with adjudicatory
proceedings, and since the Civil Rights Commission does not adjudicate, it need not be bound by adjudicatory procedures.
One familiar with the practical realities involved in the enforcement of voting rights in the South well realizes that any other
decision than that reached in Hannah v. Larche could render
wholly ineffective the functioning of the Civil Rights Commission.
"It is not a constitutional requirement that the Commission be
argumentatively turned into a forum for trial of the truth of particular allegations of denial of voting rights in order thereby to
invalidate its functioning.'' 58 The functioning of the Civil Rights
Commission would be stifled if its hearings were transformed into
trial-like proceedings and if an absolute right were given to crossexamine every witness called to testify. Nor is it hard to conceive
what practical consequences would ensue if the identity of persons
submitting complaints to the Commission had to be disclosed. "We
would be shutting our eyes to actualities to be unmindful of the
fact that it would dissuade sources of vitally relevant information
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.

at 441.
at 442.
at 492 (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
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from making that information knO"wn to the Commission, if the
Commission were required to reveal its sources and subject them
to cross-examination. " 50
V.

COMMERCE AND STATE POWER

During the 1958 Term, the Court had expanded the permissible
area of state taxation of commerce. In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 60 indeed, the high bench went so
far in upholding state taxing power that the Congress enacted a
statute expressly limiting the effect of the Court's decision, as well
as providing for a general legislative study of the whole subject.61
In the Northwestern Portland case, the Court had upheld state
power to levy income taxes upon foreign corporations engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce. This past term, in Scripto, Inc.
v. Carson,62 the Court dealt with state use taxes. The state power
to impose such taxes even upon products brought in from other
states has, of course, been settled since H enneford v. Silas Mason
Co.63 Henneford, however, left open the vital question of implementation of state power in this area. The effectiveness of a use
tax depends upon the scheme by which it is collected. Such taxes
are all but impossible to collect from the thousands of individuals
who make purchases across state lines. To overcome these difficulties, the states have attempted to make the sellers collect use
taxes for them.
The Scripto case involved such an attempt by the State of
Florida. By statute, Florida required appellant, a Georgia corporation, to be responsible for the collection of a use tax on certain
mechanical ·writing instruments which appellant sold and shipped
from its place of business in Atlanta to residents of Florida for use
and enjoyment there. Upon Scripto's failure to collect the tax,
the appellee comptroller levied a use tax liability against it. Appellant then brought this suit to test the validity of the imposition,
contending that the requirement of Florida's statute not only
placed a burden on interstate commerce, but also violated due
process. Appellant does not own, lease, or maintain any office,
distributing house, warehouse or other place of business in Florida,
or have any regular employee or agent there. Nor does it own or
50 Id. at 489.
oo 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
0173 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (Supp. I, 1959).
02 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
oa 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
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maintain any bank account or stock of merchandise in Florida.
Orders for its products are solicited by advertising specialty brokers
who are residents of Florida. At the time of suit, there were ten
such brokers-each having a written contract and a specific territory.
The Court upheld the power of Florida to collect the use tax
from appellant on the basis of property bought and shipped from
its home office to purchasers for use in Florida. For the state to
exercise such authority over the seller, there must, to use Justice
Jackson's words from an earlier case, be "some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax." 64 Such a nexus, said the Court, is present here. Where such nexus exists, the state can require that the
out-of-state seller be its tax collector on orders from its residents.
Scripto greatly weakens the effect of Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,65 where the Court had limited the power of the state of the
purchaser to make the out-of-state seller its use tax collector. In
Scripto, the Court, in effect, limits Miller Bros. to the case of a
seller who makes no effort to sell his product outside his own outof-state store. But any effort by the seller to solicit business or
otherwise exploit the consumer market in the state of the purchaser provides a sufficient nexus to enable that state to require
the seller to collect its tax.
Scripto may be understood as a logical successor of the 1958
Term decisions upholding state taxing power. But, as a practical
matter, it goes much further than they in defeating a basic purpose
of the commerce clause. The Court has upheld use taxes because
their basic purpose is to create equality as between interstate and
local commerce. Yet, in this respect, its effect is exactly that of a
protective tariff. It may be advantageous for the state to be able to
say to interstate commerce, "You may come into my borders, but
your products must be subject to the same tax burdens as local
products." There is no doubt that a sovereign country could make
such a statement and levy tariffs to carry it into effect. In our
system, however, the states are barred from laying such tariffs upon
commerce from sister states. Under the Court's decisions upholding the use tax, nevertheless, our supposedly free-trade economy
is now all but honeycombed with this type of "protective tariff."
Another area of state taxing power that is of great significance
in a federal system such as ours is that which touches the area of
64
65

Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
347 U.S. 340 (1954).
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so-called intergovernmental tax immunities. In recent years, the
high Court has been careful to limit such immunities to the governments concerned, and to withdraw the immunities that had
previously been recognized in private individuals, such as government contractors, having dealings with government. The most
recent of the cases indicating this trend was United States v. Detroit,66 decided during the 1957 Term, which held valid a local
tax imposed on a private lessee of federally-owned property.
·
Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School District,67
decided this term, shows, on the other hand, that, although such
private lessees no longer are sheltered by the protective umbrella
of the federal government's tax immunity, they may not be subjected to discriminatory state taxation. The relevant state law in
Phillips, granting the state and its subdivisions the right to tax the
lessees of federal lands, was more burdensome than the statute
granting the right to tax lessees of state lands. So substantial and
transparent a discrimination against the Government and its lessees, said the Court, must fall. Nor is the discriminaton justified
by the state's power to classify. "Where taxation of the private
use of the Government's property is concerned, the Government's
interests must be weighed in the balance. Accordingly, it does
not seem too much to require that the State treat those who deal
with the Government as well as it treats those with whom it deals
itself." 68 Though, as already stated, the recent trend is to remove the
Government's tax immunity from private persons solely because
they happen to deal 1\Tith the Government, "it still remains true,
as it has from the time of M'Culloch v. Maryland ... that a state
tax may not discriminate against the Government or those 1\Tith
whom it deals." 69
As pointed out last year,70 closely related to the cases involving
state taxation of commerce are those dealing 1\Tith state regulation
of commerce. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit71
is a case close to the line between valid and invalid state action in
that area. It arose out of the application of certain provisions of
a municipal smoke abatement code to ships operated in interstate
commerce. The ships in question were equipped with boiler
355 U.S. 466 (1958).
361 U.S. 376 (1960).
os Id. at 385.
60 Id. at 387. (Emphasis added.)
70 Schwartz, The Supreme Court-October 1958 Term, 58
71 362 U .s. 440 (1960).
66
67
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stacks emitting smoke which in density and duration exceeded the
maximum standards allowable under the relevant municipal code.
Structural alterations would be required in order to insure
compliance.
The Court upheld the application of the municipal regulation
to the interstate ships, in the absence of conflicting federal prescriptions. Such state regulation, "which does not discriminate
against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand."72 In the instant case, the
appellant had argued that, in fact, this case was comparable to
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,73 since other local governments
might impose differing requirements as to air pollution. But, said
the Court, appellant had pointed to none; the record contained
nothing to suggest the existence of any such competing or conflicting local regulations.
The implication is that for the Southern Pacific holding to
apply, it must be shown that there are actually conflicting state
regulations in existence. One wonders whether this is not to misread both Southern Pacific and the test of Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia74 upon which it was based.
In Southern Pacific itself, there was no showing that states other
than Arizona had imposed train-limit requirements. Yet that did
not deter the Court from ruling that the Arizona law was invalid.
It was the possibility, not the actuality, of a "crazy-quilt"715 of trainlimit requirements that made a uniform regulatory system essential. The variety of requirements for equipment which the states
may prescribe in order to meet their air pollution needs underscores the argument that the same considerations should apply in
a case like Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.76
VI.

CRIMINAL LAW

In explaining the recent work of the highest Court to the
English reader, Professor Carr states, "During the last decade the
Supreme Court has increasingly found itself called upon to review
criminal judgments.... Indeed, the number of cases of this type
has increased to a point where the Supreme Court devotes a large
72 Id. at 448.
73 325 U
761 (1945).
74 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
75 The term used by Justice Frankfurter

.s.

concurring in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373, 388 (1946).
76 Compare Justice Douglas dissenting, 362 U.S. 440,455 (1960).
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measure of its time and energy functioning as the nation's highest
court of criminal appeals." 77
In this respect, it should be pointed out that the role of the
highest tribunal in the criminal field has two aspects. There is, in
the first place, the Court's function in reviewing convictions appealed to it from the lower federal courts. In such cases, the high
bench acts as the direct hierarchical head of the federal judicial
system; its relation to the lower federal courts is that of chief to
subordinates. The same is not true in the second area-the review
of state court convictions. In performing this role, the Supreme
Court's authority is essentially limited to the enforcement of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Several cases decided during the past term involve familiar
exercises of the high bench's function of requiring that state convictions meet the standards of due process. In Blackburn v. Alabama,18 a conviction based upon a confession was set aside, where
the defendant, a Negro who was mentally ill, had confessed during
an eight-to-nine-hour period of sustained solitary interrogation in
a tiny room. Such confession, said the Chief Justice, "most probably was not the product of any meaningful act of volition. " 79
Therefore, its use "transgressed the imperatives of fundamental
justice which find their expression in the Due Process Clause.''80
Similarly, in Hudson v. North Carolina,81 the Court reversed
a conviction for robbery because of a denial of counsel, where the
defendant was eighteen years old and had only a sixth-grade education.82 The Court relied primarily upon the fact that midway
through the trial a codefendant was permitted to plead guilty in
the presence of the jury. This was not a case, said the Court, where
the failure to appoint counsel resulted in a constitutionally unfair
trial simply because of defendant's comparative youth. But the
guilty plea of the codefendant left defendant entirely to his own
devices at a moment of great potential prejudice. A layman alone
could not be expected to be able to deal with such a situation.
"The prejudicial position in which the petitioner found himself
when his codefendant pleaded guilty before the jury raised prob77 Carr, Civil Liberties in the United States, in PRESENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL
GovERNMENT 205 CTunz ed. 1960).
78 ll61 U.S. 199 (1960).
70 Id. at 211.
80 Ibid.
81 ll6ll U.S. 697 (1960).
82 Although he was characterized by the trial court as intelligent and familiar with

criminal trials, id. at 701.
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lems requiring professional knowledge and experience beyond a
layman's ken." 83 The decision in this respect is but an application
of the tendency noted last year8 4 to hold the denial of counsel
improper in all except the simplest cases. All but such cases may
be said to raise "problems requiring professional knowledge and
experience beyond a layman's ken." 85
A more striking case is Thompson v. City of Louisville.86
Defendant there was convicted in a municipal police court of
loitering and disorderly conduct. The conviction was based upon
defendant's presence in a cafe for over half an hour, during which
time he was "dancing by himself," "shuffling," or "patting his
feet" in time to the music. A police officer arrested him for loiter•
ing and then, after he "argued" with the officer, for disorderly
conduct. He was fined $10 on each charge.
Since police court fines of less than $20 on a single charge were
not appealable or otherwise reviewable in any other court of the
state, defendant sought review directly in the Supreme Court.
Thus, the highest court of the land acted, in effect, as a direct
appellate tribunal over a municipal police court in a case involving
an almost insignificant amount. Yet, it is basic in our system that
the importance of a case is to be found, not in its monetary impact,
but in the legal principles involved in it. Justice Black rightly
states, in his Thompson opinion, "Our examination of the record
presented in the petition for certiorari convinced us that although
the fines here are small, the due process questions presented are
substantial and we therefore granted certiorari to review the police
court's judgments."87
On the merits, the Court found that the charges against defend·
ant were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to render his
conviction unconstitutional under the due process clause. On the
facts presented, defendant could not validly be convicted either of
loitering or disorderly conduct. "Decision of ... [the due process]
question turns not on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on
whether this conviction rests upon any evidence at all."88 There
could be no conviction for loitering where defendant was acting
only as he had here. Nor could he be guilty of disorderly conduct
as Id. at 703-04.
84 Schwartz, The Supreme
85 Note 83 supra.
86 362 U
199 (1960).

.s.

81 Id. at 203.
BB Id. at 199.
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only because he had argued with the arresting officer. Thus there
was no evidence to support the convictions. "Just as 'Conviction
upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process,' so
is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without
evidence of his guilt. " 89
Perhaps the most difficult criminal cases which the Supreme
Court must decide are those involving the interplay of state and
federal power. The very nature of our federalism makes such
interaction frequent. During the 1958 Term, Bartkus v. Illinois90
and Abbate v. United States9 1 concerned one aspect of the interplay between state and federal jurisdiction-that of multiple prosecutions for the same offense. During the last term, Elkins v. United
States9 2 concerned another important aspect-that of the use of
evidence in the courts of one jurisdiction which had been secured
by officers of another.
Elkins arose out of a federal conviction for intercepting and
recording telephone communications and divulging such communications in violation of the Communications Act. Defendants
made a motion to suppress certain evidence which had originally
been seized by state law enforcement officers from the home of one
of the defendants under circumstances which were found by the
courts of the state to render the search and seizure unlawful. The
federal trial court denied the motion to suppress; the Supreme
Court reversed.
As stated by the Court, the question presented in Elkins was:
"May articles obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and
seizure by state officers, without involvement of federal officers, be
introduced in evidence against a defendant over his timely objection in a federal criminal trial?" 93 To answer this question, a word
must be said about the prior cases on this subject.
In Weeks v. United States,94 the Court laid down the basic rule
which excludes in a federal criminal prosecution evidence obtained
by federal agents in violation of defendant's fourth amendment
rights. At the same time, the Weeks decision dealt with articles
used as evidence in a federal court which had been seized by local
police officers acting on their own account. The Court held that
89 Id. at
90 1159 U

206.
121
911159 U.S. 187
ll2 364 U.S. 206
llS Id. at 208.
94 232 U .s. 383

.s.

(1959).
(1959).
(1960).
(1914).
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the admission of this evidence was not error for "the fourth amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of such [state] officials. Its limitations reach the Federal government and its agencies."95 This second aspect of the Weeks opinion came to be called
the "silver-platter" doctrine. It had been consistently applied in
many cases prior to Elkins.
In Elkins, the Court reexamined the validity of the "silverplatter" doctrine and rejected it. In the Court's view, the reasoning upon which Weeks rested-that the fourth amendment is not
directed against misconduct of state officials-has not been valid
since Wolf v. Colorado. 96 That case, said the Elkins Court, determined that the "Federal Constitution, by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state
officers." 97 Wolf, in this view, removed the doctrinal underpinning
for the silver-platter doctrine. "The foundation upon which the
admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal trial originally
rested-that unreasonable state searches did not violate the Federal
Constitution-thus disappeared.... " 98
Elkins consequently rejected the doctrine that freely admitted
in a federal criminal trial evidence seized by state agents in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. In its place, it substitutes the rule "that evidence obtained by state officers during a
search which, if conduced by federal officers, would have violated
the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures
under the fourth amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's
timely objection in a federal criminal trial." 99
One cannot but sympathize with the Court's feeling in Elkins
that the federal courts should not "be accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold." 100 Nevertheless, one may wonder whether Wolf v. Colorado does destroy
the doctrinal underpinning of the express limitation of the Weeks
exclusionary rule to cases of federal violations as clearly as Elkins
indicates. The Elkins approach assumes that, as a consequence of
Wolf, precisely the same rules are applicable in determining
whether the conduct of state officers violates the Constitution as
are applicable in determining whether the conduct of federal officers does so. But this ignores the basic distinction between the
95 Id.

at 398.
U.S. 25 (1949).
97 Note 92 supra, at 213.
9Blbid.
99 Id. at 223.
100Jbid.

96 338
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specifics of a provision of the Bill of Rights and the generalities of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf itself,
despite the Elkins opinion, did not make every technical state
violation of the fourth amendment so contrary to basic standards
of justice as to make it automatically a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Elkins appears to disregard the essential difference,
so strongly emphasized only last term in the Bartkus case,1°1 between the particularities of the first eight amendments and the
fundamental nature of what constitutes due process.102
VII. FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
In the Supreme Court of recent years, one of the sharpest divisions has concerned the scope of the first amendment. More specifically, are first amendment rights to be treated like other constitutional rights and, as such, subject to legislative restraint in
appropriate cases? Or, are such rights to occupy a "preferred position," with the absolute language of the first amendment given
literal effect, so that they are subject to no legislative qualification
whatever?
During the past term, the division in the Court on this subject
appears to have continued unabated. The two wings of the high
bench continued to express their own views on the matter. The
actual first amendment decisions, however, found both wings in
agreement in striking down three different state laws. The first of
these laws was the municipal ordinance at issue in Smith v. California.103 It made it unlawful "for any person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent ·writing [or] book ... in any place
of business where ... books ... are sold or kept for sale." The
offense in Smith was defined by the state courts to consist solely of
the possession, in appellant's bookstore, of a certain book found
upon judicial investigation to be obscene. The definition included
no element of scienter-knowledge by appellant of the contents of
the book-and thus the ordinance was construed as imposing
"strict" or "absolute" criminal liability.
The Supreme Court held that, as so construed, it was in conflict with the Federal Constitution. In 1957 Roth v. United
States104 had, it is true, recognized that obscene speech is not en101 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
102 Compare Justice Frankfurter dissenting

233 (1960).
108 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
104 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,

426

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

titled to first amendment protection. This decision was not, as
such, altered by Smith. But Smith holds that although "traffic in
obscene literature may be outlawed as a crime ... one cannot be
made amenable to such criminal outlawry unless he is chargeable
with knowledge of the obscenity."105 In Justice Brennan's words,
"[O]ur holding in Roth does not recognize any state power to
restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene; and we
think this ordinance's strict liability feature would tend seriously
to have that effect, by penalizing booksellers, even though they
had not the slightest notice of the character of the books they
sold."106
Justice Brennan draws an instructive parallel between the ordinance at issue in Smith and familiar forms of penal statutes which
dispense with any element of knowledge on the part of the person
charged. The example given of such a penal statute is the modern
food and drug law. In such cases, says Justice Brennan, the public
interest in the purity of its food is so great that defendant's ignorance of the character of particular food is irrelevant. "There is
no specific constitutional inhibition against making the distributors
of food the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in
the way of imposing a similar requirement on the bookseller.''107
Such a requirement would result in a severe limitation "on the
public's access to constitutionally protected literature. 'For if the
bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents,
and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the
books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have
imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally
protected as well as obscene literature.' " 108 Interestingly enough,
this intimation that speech occupies a preferred position, compared
to the right to sell food and drugs, was expressly seconded by Justice
Frankfurter.109
In Talley v. California,11° a second municipal ordinance was
condemned as an invalid restriction of first amendment rights. The
ordinance in question prohibited the distribution of any handbill
in any place under any circumstances, unless the handbills had
105 Note 103 supra, at 161 (characterization of majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
concurring).
106 Id. at 152.
101 Id. at 152-53.
108 Id. at 153.
109 Id. at 162.
110 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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printed on them the names and addresses of the persons who
prepared, distributed or sponsored them. Petitioner had been
convicted for violating this ordinance. He had distributed handbills urging a boycott against certain merchants on the ground that,
as one set of handbills said, they carried products of "manufacturers
who will not offer equal employment opportunities to Negroes,
Mexicans, and Orientals." The handbills did not have printed on
them the information required by the ordinance.
In the leading case of Lovell v. Griffin,111 the Court held void
on its face an ordinance that forbade any distribution of literature
at any time or place without a license. Such ordinance amounted
to a previous restraint upon publication and distribution of a type
wholly inconsistent with the notion of freedom of speech. According to the Court, the Talley ordinance falls under the ban of the
Griffin decision. The identification requirement imposed tends
to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom
of expression. "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout
history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws
either anonymously or not at all."112 "[I]dentification and fear of
reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance."113 An ordinance which has such effect is, like
that at issue in Lovell v. Griffin, void on its face.
Another case illustrating that there are times and circumstances
when states may not compel members of groups engaged in the
dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified is Bates v. City of
Little Rock.114 Petitioners there had been convicted of violating
an ordinance of an Arkansas municipality by refusing a demand to
furnish city officials with a list of the names of the members of a
local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People. The municipality concerned had for some years
imposed annual license taxes on a broad variety of businesses, occupations, and professions. In 1957, it added the requirement
that any organization operating within the municipality must
supply to the city clerk, upon request, specified information including a list of all members and contributors. Petitioners, custodians of the records of the local branch of the NAACP, had
111303 U.S. 444 (1938).
112 Note 110 supra, at 64.
113 Id. at 65.
114 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
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supplied the municipality with all the information required by
the ordinance except that which would have required disclosure
of the names of the organization's members and contributors.
The Supreme Court held that in the circumstances presented
the requirement of disclosure constituted an invalid restriction of
a first amendment right. The first amendment guarantees freedom of assembly, which includes the correlative right of freedom
of association. "Freedoms such as these are protected not only
against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by
more subtle governmental interference."115 Disclosure of affiliation with a group engaged in advocacy, like the NAACP, could
constitute an effective restraint of freedom of association. "On this
record it sufficiently appears that compulsory disclosure of the
membership lists of the local branches of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People would work a significant
interference with the freedom of association of their members."116
The holding that the ordinance thus restricts a first amendment
right does not, however, of itself wholly resolve the case. Only
under an absolutist view of the first amendment would that be
true.11 7 To a Court which, in the main, rejects that view, a balancing of the interests involved is required. Justice Stewart, who delivered the Bates opinion, stated, "Decision in this case must
finally turn, therefore, on whether the cities as instrumentalities of
the State have demonstrated so cogent an interest in obtaining
and making public the membership lists of these organizations as
to justify the substantial abridgment of associational freedom which
such disclosures will effect. Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. " 118 In the instant
case, no such showing is made. On the contrary, here there is no
"relevant correlation between the power of the municipalities to
impose occupation license taxes and the compulsory disclosure and
publication of the membership lists of the local branches of the"
NAACP.119 Consequently, the municipality had failed to demonstrate a controlling justification for the deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the membership lists
would cause.
115 Id. at 523.
116 Id. at 523-24.
117 Such view is

527-28.
118 Id.
119 Id.

at 524.
at 525.
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THE COURT AS AN INSTITUTION

One who yearly analyzes the work of the highest tribunal well
realizes the truth in Cardozo's famous statement that the law has its
periods of ebbs and flow. Certainly, it will hardly be contended
that the 1959 Term constituted one of the flood tides of Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Indeed, compared to some of the more
recent terms of the Warren Court, the one under review may
seem relatively inconsequential.
Yet, even "ordinary" terms of the high bench are not without
significance to students of the Court as an institution. If anything,
in fact, such terms may be of even greater value from the point of
view of day-to-day institutional functioning. Great cases, like
hard cases, are prone to make bad law.12° Cases decided in the
glare of the cause celebre are far more apt to distort the functioning
. of the deciding tribunal than those dealt with under calmer circumstances.
In a Court divided, as it is, between two polar extremes, however, even the seemingly run-of-the-mill case may lead to articulation of the sharpest differences, and even to expressions of
acerbity among the Justices. The division between the rival
judicial philosophies of Justices Frankfurter and Black, which has
been the outstanding characteristic of the Court in recent years,
has continued. And, as has been true of the terms since 1956, it
has been the Frankfurter approach that has continued to command
the allegiance of a majority of the Justices.
Wholly apart from the merits upon which the basic division in
the Court is grounded, the most distressing aspect of such division
is its constant articulation by the Justices concerned. Thus,
Justice Black continues to seize every occasion to repeat his preferred-position philosophy on the first amendment. While, on his
side, Justice Frankfurter does the same to reiterate his view on the
same matter. It is rare for either to concur silently in a decision
involving any of the points on which there is fundamental disagreement between them. The result, of course, is that it is all but
impossible to obtain a single opinion of the Court-or even a single
dissent-in cases involving such points.
One wonders whether the best way to win acceptance of
judicial doctrine is to thrust such doctrine into every case where it
may conceivably be involved. It may be doubted, on the contrary,
120 Compare Justice Douglas dissenting in United Steelworkers v. United States. 361
U.S. 39, 62 (1959).
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whether the constant proliferation of dissents and concurrences,
which are only variations on the same theme, actually accomplish
the purpose intended by their authors.
A dissent or concurrence, to paraphrase Chief Justice Hughes,
is an appeal to the intelligence of a future day when a later decision
may possibly adopt the reasoning urged.121 Such appeals can
surely be made more effectively by judges who have not exercised
overfreely their right of speaking to the future. Thus, the most
effective dissents are surely not those rendered by Justices who have
established a reputation for disagreeing with their colleagues.
In the immediate future the Court will continue to be divided
along its present lines, even when the two principal polar figures
themselves no longer actively participate. And, rash though it
may be to attempt to predict, there is no reason to assume any real
upset in the present posture in the Court. If anything, in fact, the
Black approach should suffer the more severe blow when its chief
exponent is no longer on the bench. For, far more than the school
of self-restraint, it depends for its effectiveness on the personal
forcefulness of those who articulate it.
In the long run it is hard to see how a high Court in a democratic society can long be activist in the Black sense. This is
true regardless of the personnel that may compose such Court. In
a system such as ours, it is the political branches, not the judiciary
that must be endowed with the primacy. For the Court to assert
the degree of power demanded by the activist philosophy would be
for it to deflect responsibility from those on whom it must ultimately rest in a democratic society-the people. In Marshall's apt
language, "The people made the Constitution and the people can
unmake it. It is the creature of their wills and lives only by their
will."122 Even in our system, the Constitution is what the judges
say it is only if ultimately the judges say what most of the people
want them to say.128
121 HUGHF.S, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF.5 68 (1928).
122 Quoted 309 U.S. xv (1940).
128 Peltason, The National Courts, the Federal System, and the States'
PRESENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 184 Gunz ed. 1960).
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